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CAN THE COMMON LAW SURVIVE IN THE
MODERN STATUTORY ENVIRONMENT?
H. Marlow Greent
INTRODUCTION
In an era of statutory and regulatory dominance in the field of envi-
ronmental law, lawyers might benefit from investigating the fate of the
common law. Prior to the advent of the modem federal statutory and
regulatory environmental regime, implemented circa 1970, the common
law stood as the only legal system available to protect environmental
quality. Indications from certain jurisdictions are that prior to the 1970s,
the common law was rising admirably to the task of championing the
cause of environmental well-being.' But beyond these earlier common
law successes, there are other philosophical considerations that should
prompt us to preserve environmental common law remedies in the face
of the modem statutory and regulatory regime. The purpose of this arti-
cle is neither to present these considerations nor to articulate a defense of
t Associate, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Seattle Washington. J.D., Cornell University,
1997; B.A., Cornell College, 1994. The author extends gratitude to the Political Economy
Research Center ("PERC") for its assistance and to Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski, for his valua-
ble input. Also, thanks go to Michael, Connor and McKenna.
1 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) (holding that defendant
copper smelters' new emission-control equipment, which defendant installed to prevent dis-
charges earlier held to be public nuisances, not sufficiently effective); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (holding that discharges from defendant copper smelters caused a
public nuisance and that defendants must build more emission-control equipment); Maddox v.
International Paper Co., 105 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. La. 1951) (holding that a downstream property
owner had suffered damages resulting from discharges of an upstream paper mill) upheld in
International Paper Co. v. Maddox, 203 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1953); Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min-
ing & Concentrating Co. v. Polak, 7 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1925) (holding that property owner
suffered nuisance damages from the installation of a new city sewage system opposite it prop-
erty); Carmichael v. Texarkana, 94 F.561 (V.D. Ark. 1899); United Verde Extension Mining
Co. v. Ralston, 296 P 262 (Sup. Ct. Az. 1931) (holding that a property holder suffered nui-
sance damages resulting from discharges from a heavy-metal smelter nine miles from the
property owner's farm); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1970) (holding that discharges from a cement plant caused a nuisance to a property owner and
granting an injunction against the plant until such time as the plant paid permanent damages to
plaintiff); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. Ct. App.1903) (holding that
paper mill must be enjoined in nuisance from polluting a downstream farmer and, further,
rejecting a balancing of interests test that would have allowed the paper mill to continue de-
spite its polluting activity); Sammons v. City of Gloversville, 67 N.E. 622 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1903) (holding that a city must be enjoined in nuisance from dumping sewage into a creek
upon which plaintiff's farm was situated); and Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790
(Or. 1959) (holding that discharges from defendant's aluminum reduction plant trespassed
onto plaintiffs property and that defendant must thus be enjoined from polluting).
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the common law. Other sources have set forth these arguments and have
described model common law systems that could treat environmental is-
sues.2 Rather, the purpose of this article is simply to present the results
of two empirical studies designed to assess the viability of the common
law in the environmental arena and, further, to use this empirical data to
speculate as to the future viability of the common law. Toward this end,
Part I describes a survey of environmental litigators designed to deter-
mine whether, despite conclusions one could reach as a matter of law, the
common law remains a viable instrument in the minds of those who
would be most apt to use it: environmental litigators. Part II describes a
year-by-year survey through the case law on Westlaw. Both studies ex-
amine the extent to which the federal statutory system has, in fact, had
either a positive or a negative impact on the common law.
Before assessing the de facto impact of the federal environmental
statutes on the common law, it is worth discussing the extent to which
those statutes have preempted the common law as a matter of law. The
federal environmental statutes preserve common law actions. In particu-
lar, § 505(e) of the Clean Water Act and §304(e) of the Clean Air Act,
also known as the "citizen suits" provisions, state that such suit provi-
sions cannot be read to revoke other remedies provided under "any stat-
ute or common law."'3 In the process of interpreting the citizen suits
provision in the Clean Water Act, the United States Supreme Court has
limited plaintiffs who sue for common law relief in interstate pollution
cases to using the common law of the state that is the source of the
pollution, rather than the common law of the state that is the recipient of
the subject pollution.4
Given that state common law claims against pollution have not, in
general, been preempted by the federal statutes as a matter of law, the
question thus becomes whether state common law claims have suffered
2 See, e.g., H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A
Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England and a
Model for the Future, 30 CoiuLL ITrr'L. L.J. 542-44 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, SIMPLE
RuLas FOR A CoMvLEx WORLD 275-305 (1995).
3 Clean Water Act § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1986); Clean Air Act § 304(e), 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604(e) (1986).
4 See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). It is worth noting
that the Supreme Court had dealt with the common law preemption issue prior to Ouellette. In
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 451 U.S. 304 (1981), another case involving interstate pollution,
the Court held that, despite § 505(e) of the Clean Water Act, the Act had nevertheless pre-
empted federal common law. As a result of the defendant's discharging sewage in compliance
with federal permits granted pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and because the Act had pre-
empted the federal common law, the plaintiffs could not sue for nuisance relief under the
federal common law. This federal common law, oddly enough, was created by the Supreme
Court almost a decade earlier in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), in order to provide
the same plaintiff relief from the same pollution at a time prior to the creation of the statutory
relief that protected them in 1981.
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de facto preemption at the hand of the federal statutory and regulatory
system. To address to this latter question, I conducted the two empirical
studies described below.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATORS SURVEY
A. DESIGN
The survey presented environmental litigators across the nation with
a hypothetical pollution scenario that had equally viable solutions under
either the common law or the federal statutes. It was my hope that an
analysis of the responses would provide insight into the extent to which
environmental litigators would use the common law despite, or in addi-
tion to, the federal statutes. I designed the survey as follows.
I divided the nation into four geographic regions: East, West, Mid-
west and South/Southwest. Next, I collected the names of eight to ten
law firms from each geographic region from the Guide to Legal Employ-
ers for 1995 produced by the National Association of Law Placement, 5
which listed themselves as having significant environmental practices.
After assembling a sample of thirty-eight firms, I proceeded to "cold-
call" each firm's environmental department to ask for survey volunteers.
Seventeen out of the thirty-eight firms, or approximately forty-seven per-
cent, had individual litigators who were willing to participate in the
survey.
The hypothetical situation I presented to each of these litigators in-
volved a factory that owned and operated its own sewage treatment plant
that was discharging into a stream. The cattle of a downstream water
rights holder (either riparian or appropriative) were being sickened from
the treatment plant's discharge. Next, I asked each participant three
questions:
1. Assuming the discharger is violating its National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System permit ("NPDES") 6, and assuming that settle-
ment is not an option, what legal course of action would the participant
take (if representing the plaintiff), or with what legal actions would the
participant expect to be faced (if representing the defendant)?
2. Assuming the discharger is in compliance with its permit, what
legal course of action would the participant take?
3. What is the participant's sense of the viability and vitality of the
common law remedies in the participant's environmental law practice?
5 NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLAcEmENT, INc., 1996-1996 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LEGAL
EMPLOYERS (1998).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1986).
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B. RESULTS
The responses to questions one through three from the seventeen
participants are summarized in charts one through three, respectively.
Summarizing the data presented in charts one through three, fifteen
of the seventeen participants would have brought, or expected to face, as
the case may be, both federal statutory and state common law actions
under the scenario where the discharger was in violation of its NPDES
permit. One participant indicated that he or she would have only brought
a federal statutory claim. Surprisingly, one participant indicated that he
or she would have only brought a state common law claim.
Under the scenario where the discharger was in compliance with its
NPDES permit, fourteen of the seventeen participants indicated their be-
lief that the state common law claim would have remained viable in their
minds despite compliance with the permit. In other words, compliance
with the federal permit would not have been a defense, or at least not a
complete defense, to a nuisance or trespass claim according to these four-
teen participants. Two of the seventeen, however, thought that compli-
ance with a federal permit would have rendered the state common law
claim nonviable.
Perhaps most enlightening were the responses to question three,
which asked the participants to opine as to the common law's viability in
their respective environmental practices. For the sake of convenience, I
have categorized these responses into four groups: (1) "Viable Plus," (2)
"Viable," (3) "Viable Minus" and (4) "Not Viable."'7 The "Viable Plus"
category includes responses to the effect that the state common law not
only remains viable, it is, in fact quite healthy. The "Viable Minus" cate-
gory includes responses to the effect that state common law claims are
viable, but not necessarily very strong. Respondents in the "Viable Mi-
nus" category expressed a general belief that common law claims are
"kitchen sink" claims that environmental litigators bring in order to en-
sure that they have drafted a thorough complaint. Almost every partici-
pant thought that state common law claims are viable to varying degrees.
Six participants, however, thought that state common law claims are via-
ble, but not necessarily healthy, in comparison to four participants who
thought that state common law claims are alive and well in present-day
environmental jurisprudence.
7 Indeed, the participant who provided the single "Not Viable" response did so in the
pattern of enthusiastic defense rhetoric, opining that state common law claims were
"frivolous."
[Vol. 8:89
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C. DIscussioN
The design of the environmental litigators survey is admittedly open
to criticisms directed at its scientific weaknesses. The survey sample
was not very large. The response rate was not very impressive. The
sample was not particularly random, and biases-especially those in
favor of defense counsel-lurk in the nature of many firms included in
the NALP Guide. Nevertheless, the results are instructive because they
indicate that environmental litigators do consider common law claims
such as trespass and nuisance to be alive. An overwhelming majority
(approximately ninety-four percent) of those surveyed expressed this
view, and the size of this majority quells some of the weaknesses of the
survey. Thus, the survey provides evidence that those most likely to use,
or to face, common law environmental claims consider them viable.
The chief difficulty with interpreting the results of the environmen-
tal litigators survey lies in discerning a consensus view as to the degree
of vitality that these common law claims possess. Sixteen of the seven-
teen attorneys surveyed thought that the common law was a viable rem-
edy to some degree, but they were split in their opinions as to the
strength of this viability. We are thus left with a general sense that the
common law is alive but not necessarily healthy.
II. WESTLAW DATABASE SURVEY
A. DESIGN
My intention, with respect to the Westlaw survey, was simply to
count the number of reported cases in which trespass or nuisance were
brought against environmental harm each year in state courts versus fed-
eral courts from and including 1945 through 1994. The objective was to
determine if there were any noticeable trends in the numbers of such
cases, in each of these categories of courts, over the designated time
span. The search that I used initially was broad: NUISANCE or TRES-
PASS and POLLUT! This search produced a number of "hits" that were
in fact landlord and tenant cases. After reading through several, I deter-
mined them to be unrelated common law environmental claims. Hence, I
revised the search and used the following for the study: NUISANCE or
TRESPASS and POLLUT! but not LANDLORD but not TENANT. I
ran this search in each of the ALLSTATES and ALLFEDS databases,
restricting the date by year for each year from and including 1945
through 1994. I then skimmed through each case to sort out those that
were unrelated to common law environmental claims. Some cases in-
volved solely a common law environmental claim, while some involved
claims in combination with common law environmental claims, includ-
ing federal statutory claims.
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B. RESULTS
The tabulated results of this Westlaw survey are illustrated in graph-
ical form in chart four (Federal) and chart five (State). Chart six places
the graphs from charts four and five together in order to aid comparison.
Perhaps the most apparent trend in this data is the significant increase in
the number of common law cases reported circa 1970, the dates of which
approximately correspond with the passage of significant federal envi-
ronmental legislation.
A second noticeable trend occurs in the 1980s. Until the latter half
of the 1980s, for all prior years in the time span, the number of state-
reported common law environmental claims was greater than the number
reported in federal courts for each and every year. After the mid 1980s,
the number of state-reported common law environmental claims became
less than the number reported in federal courts with two exceptions for
1988 and 1992.
The numbers provided in charts four through six are raw. Hence, to
construct a more accurate rendition of any phenomena that might exist in
this data, these same numbers must be presented in real terms. Charts
seven and eight present the numbers from their respective counterpart
charts four and five as percentages of the per-year total number of cases
reported in each of the respective federal and state databases. 8 Chart
nine places the graphs from charts seven and eight together to aid com-
parison. To further aid comparison and discussion of this "real" data,
charts ten and eleven present the percentage data from charts seven and
eight in terms of the average number of cases reported per 10,000
throughout ten five-year periods, beginning with the period from and in-
cluding 1945 through 1949. Chart twelve presents the graphs from
charts ten and eleven together.
Both charts nine and twelve illustrate the same dramatic increase in
the number of common law environmental claims reported in the early
1970s that was revealed in the raw data (as illustrated in chart six),
although the real increase does not seem to be as impressive with respect
to the state courts. Notably, chart 12 shows that the average number of
common law claims reported in federal courts in the first half of the
1970s was more than six times the average number reported in the last
half of the 1960s.
The second trend revealed in the raw numbers persists in the real
numbers as well, but it becomes even more striking when viewed in real
terms. Chart nine shows that, in real terms, the number of common law
environmental claims reported in state courts was always greater than the
number reported in. federal courts until 1978. After this time, the number
8 These total reported cases figures were provided courtesy of Westlaw.
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of claims reported in federal courts always exceeded the number reported
in state courts, except in 1979 and 1984. Chart twelve makes the point
even more vividly. Looking at chart twelve, one might wonder whether,
beginning in the last half of the 1970s and continuing through the re-
mainder of the time span, federal courts began to siphon off common law
environmental claims from the state courts.
One final observation from both the raw and the real data is that
after the dramatic increase in reported common law environmental
claims that occurred circa 1970, the number reported in both state and
federal courts tapered off for the remainder of the time span. Further-
more, in real terms, the number of common law environmental claims
reported in state courts for the 1980s and beyond, on average, were at an
all-time low when compared to previous periods for the time span.
C. DIscussIoN
Interpreting the trends perceived in the data from this Westlaw sur-
vey is not a straightforward task. The striking increase in the number of
reported common law claims beginning circa 1970 certainly correlates
with the advent of the federal environmental statutes. Still, one must not
be too hasty in attributing a cause and effect relationship between the
federal statutes and the increased number of common law claims. It
could be the case that both the increase in common law claims and the
passage of the federal statutes were in response to the same underlying
cause-a growing societal environmental awareness perhaps.
What is possibly more crucial to the issue of the vitality of environ-
mental common law going forward, is an analysis of the second-dis-
cussed observation from the Westlaw survey. What of -the apparent
siphoning-off, on the part of federal courts, of state common law claims?
One plausible theory for this siphoning-off phenomenon is founded
in federal civil procedure. In order for a federal court to exercise juris-
diction over a particular claim, it must have either diversity jurisdiction
over the parties to the claim9 or jurisdiction over the claim itself.'0 If a
federal court has jurisdiction over a claim, it may also exercise pendant
jurisdiction over state common law claims arising out of the same trans-
action or occurrence." Each of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts has
a citizen suit provision that allows private citizens to bring claims against
polluters in federal court.' 2 Perhaps private citizens who found them-
selves armed with federal environmental citizen suit provisions began
bringing claims against polluters beginning in the 1970s, and, to give
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980).
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990).
12 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1986).
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themselves every chance for success, they brought pendant claims under
state nuisance or trespass laws as well. As more claims against polluters
were brought in reliance upon the federal citizen suit provisions - some
of which had state common law claims thrown in -- fewer claims were
left to the state courts. In this manner, the federal statutes would have
provided the mechanism through which federal courts essentially
siphoned off state common law claims from the state courts.
If this explanation for the observed decline .of state common law
claims after the mid-1970s is correct, such would imply rather negative
consequences for the development of environmental common law going
forward. As previously mentioned, in real terms, the number of reported
state common law environmental claims is at an all-time low. And yet it
is in the state courts, where nuisance and trespass claims are more likely
to receive careful contemplation, that the common law evolves and de-
velops to meet the needs of a changing society. This type of thoughtful
evolution would likely not occur in federal courts where the state com-
mon law claims would rarely receive the greater part of the court's atten-
tion. Indeed it would likely be the case that, in federal court, the federal
claim would receive the bulk of the court's consideration. And so com-
mon law environmental actions, although perhaps given lip service in a
federal complaint or judicial opinion, would be abandoned as a relic of
the pre-statutory past.
Like the environmental litigators survey, the design of this Wesflaw
survey is also subject to attack on certain fronts. Electronic searches are
always exposed to the related problems of over- and under inclusiveness.
If a search is exceedingly overinclusive, the researcher must wade
through mountains of irrelevant material. If it is underinclusive, the re-
searcher will never see relevant data.
Another flaw may lie in the nature of the types of cases that are
reported. Reported cases are primarily appellate cases. Some might ar-
gue that the most substantial developments in the common law occur at
the trial court level rather than at the appellate court level. This observa-
tion, if true, stands as an attack on much more than the strength of this
Westlaw survey. The casebooks from which lawyers are trained and ed-
ucated rarely have trial court opinions in them. As a rule, we study ap-
pellate decisions in order to learn about the evolution and development
of the common law on particular subjects. It is within the constraints of
this tradition that the results of this Westlaw survey might cause concern
for the vitality of environmental common law. If environmental com-
mon law is dying at the appellate level, is it not in fact dying?
[Vol. 8:89
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CONCLUSION
The studies presented herein are in the family of first generation
studies. They are rough and untested. An underlying goal of presenting
this data is to stimulate the production of additional data so that we can
gain a more accurate understanding of what has happened to the common
law over the last half of this century and particularly since circa 1970.
Information about its past will aid in forecasting its future.
What do the preliminary data presented in this article suggest about
the future of the common law? The uneasy sense of common law viabil-
ity communicated by environmental litigators in the survey, combined
with the exposed siphoning-off of common law actions from state courts
to federal courts, promises a grim fate for the common law. These data
suggest that the common law is dying at the hands of federal statutory
and regulatory law.
The most compelling study is the Wesflaw case count. The trend
since circa 1975, apparent in the adjusted year-to-year numbers illus-
trated in chart nine, is made explicit in the five-year numbers presented
in chart twelve. The overall number of common law actions against en-
vironmental harm being reported is shrinking and, further, reported com-
mon law cases at the state level are dwindling in the face of federal
statutory dominance. One could readily hypothesize, based on these
data, that if the trend continues, there will soon (perhaps by the year
2010) be no common law cases at the state level left to report. It will
probably not be too long thereafter before the same extinction will occur
at the federal level. Even if this phenomenon does not occur at the fed-
eral level, the common law will be little better off, given that the cores of
environmental claims brought in federal courts are most likely to be
based upon federal environmental statutes.
These preliminary data thus spell out the new task with which we
are confronted. We must gather sufficient additional data to assess pre-
cisely what is happening to the common law as statutory law continues
its expansion. If additional data support the conclusions drawn herein,
that the common law is on the road to extinction at the hands of statutory
law, then the question will become not whether the common law can
survive in the midst of the current statutory environment, but rather,
whether we should care to reverse its fate.
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